Chapter 1

Coming to America

*The Impact of the New Immigration on Crime*

*Ramiro Martinez Jr.*

The latest wave of immigration\(^1\) to the United States—mainly from Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America—has permanently altered the racial and ethnic composition of the United States.\(^2\) One consequence is that Latinos replaced African Americans as the largest ethnic minority group at the turn of the new century. Many communities, both inside and outside traditional destination points in the southwestern United States, also felt a larger immigrant presence as Latinos in particular expanded the boundaries of older urban communities, reached into suburban areas, and pushed into small towns and rural communities in regions of the country where few co-ethnics had previously resided.\(^3\) Moreover, Asians—one of the fastest growing immigrant groups—are now proportionally more numerous than African Americans in some West Coast cities, and several communities are now dominated by this new population. On the other side of the country, large Haitian and Jamaican communities are emerging, while immigrants from Africa are a burgeoning presence in many East Coast neighborhoods. The increasing numbers and diversity of the newcomers, overwhelmingly non-European in composition, have sparked a heated public debate about the consequences of immigration, shifting discourse from concerns about race to concerns about immigrants.

For example, discussion of social problems stereotypically associated with racial minorities (e.g., blacks and Native Americans), such as high rates of male unemployment, substance abuse, and violent crime involvement, have now become important themes in the public immigration debate. At the same time, discussion has shifted to the “Latino problem” or the “immigrant dilemma,” again raising time-honored fears and
suspicions about the newcomers. Since at least 1980, studies of race in the traditional black-and-white framework have increasingly been supplanted by more nuanced scholarly explorations of ethnicity. Research has appeared with increasing frequency on “Latino,” “Asian,” and even “Afro-Caribbean” populations at the same time that foreign-born newcomers have been changing the racial and ethnic configuration of the United States. While studies of immigrants in many social science disciplines have proliferated, less attention has been paid to immigrant crime or the consequences of immigration on crime, despite an intensified public debate about this topic. The current volume is an attempt to help fill this void in the research literature.

The contributors to this volume were asked that to the degree possible they cover the extent of immigrant criminal activity or immigrant victimization. The latter topic—the criminal victimization of immigrants—in particular is an overlooked theme in the social science literature and certainly not an issue central to the public debate on crime. Yet victimization among this group is an important social problem to explore, since it both contributes to crime in the United States and helps form immigrants’ perception of the criminal justice system. Over time, it also shapes the nature and extent of the immigrant experience with other racial/ethnic group members and with co-ethnics in new communities as they are incorporated into society.

In the following sections, I highlight current stereotypes about immigrant criminality and provide a brief overview of early theoretical and empirical work on the immigration and crime relationship. I then focus on more contemporary work in this area. In the last section of the chapter, I address the many contributions the current volume makes to the nascent immigration and crime literature.

Criminal Immigrant Stereotypes

The connection between immigration and crime is an important issue to consider. Debates on the topic date back more than a hundred years; some early twentieth-century writers alleged that immigrant groups were biologically deficient compared with nonimmigrants. Thus crime and disorder were among several harmful outcomes that could be expected as long as “inferior” immigrants were allowed to enter the country. Reactions to the alleged link between immigration and crime were soon reflected in
immigration policy. In fact, the growing fear of immigrants and crime helped facilitate the passage of the Emergency Immigration Act of 1921 and the Immigration Act of 1924, which substantially reduced the number of immigrants admitted to the United States.7

The public media and politicians are now again debating the costs and consequences of allowing immigrants into American society, and, in the new era of immigration, familiar fears about the potential criminal activities of the newcomers have risen. Without much empirical research to consider, this debate risks inaccuracies and exaggerations of the level of immigrant crime, while possibly inflaming unfounded public concerns that immigrants might become an underclass group of criminals. Such fears have also been fueled by some academicians and writers. To illustrate, I present three recent examples from pseudo—social scientists and self-styled public intellectuals, along with empirically based assessments of their claims. I focus on Latinos in particular and look at a range of “concerns” and “claims” about Latino “crime.” The first example comes from Dr. Samuel P. Huntington, a professor of political science at Harvard University and author of the widely read and often contested book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. More recently in his latest book, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity, he continues to perpetuate stereotypes of an immigrant group singled out by many as crime-prone decades ago:

The Cubanization of Miami coincided with high levels of crime. For each year between 1985 and 1993, Miami ranked among the top three large cities (over 250,000 people) in violent crime. Much of this was related to the growing drug trade but also to the intensity of Cuban immigrant politics. . . . Political groups, race riots, and drug-related crime had made Miami a volatile and often dangerous place.8

There are several inaccuracies and ambiguities in this statement. First, in referring to a “Cubanization” of Miami that took place in the 1980s, Huntington seems to ignore the sizable Cuban population that already lived in Miami before that time. Since an estimated 125,000 Mariel Cubans arrived in South Florida between April and October 1980, it is important to distinguish between Cubans living in Miami before 1980 and those who immigrated during and after the Mariel boatlift. This omission is curious because Huntington does distinguish between Mariel and other Cuban immigrants in his chapter “Mexican Immigration and Hispanization” and
Mariels were often stereotyped as especially crime prone by the national and local media. Regardless, published research demonstrates that the Mariel Cuban homicide victim and offending rates rose in the early 1980s, approaching those of African Americans at one point, but then declined to levels of other Latinos and non-Latino whites by 1985, the starting date of Huntington’s concerns about Cubanization.9

Huntington also claims that Miami ranked high in violent crime during a period (1990–93) when the Mariel Cubans were rarely arrested for any killings. In fact, there were so few Mariels engaging in homicide in the late 1980s that the Miami Police Department homicide detectives stopped distinguishing them from other ethnic groups by 1990.10 Moreover, while Miami had its share of drug-related homicides, between 1980 and 1990 at least 83 percent of solved homicides were not related to drugs.11 Last, violent crime rates rose nationally during this period, including in places with few immigrants.12 The city of Miami, a place with high poverty rates, a factor known to be associated with higher crime and violence, was near the top of this list even before the 1980 Mariel boatlift or “Cubanization” more generally. For example, Marvin Wolfgang, in his classic _Patterns in Criminal Homicide_, lists ten cities with the highest rates of homicide using data from 1950, a point predating sizable immigration from Cuba. Miami is at the top of that list.13

A second example of an inaccurate statement on criminal immigrants is provided in a widely publicized memoir by Victor Davis Hanson, a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution in Stanford, California. The author focuses on the Central Valley area, another region that traditionally has experienced significant immigration:

The Latino death rate—both citizens and aliens—from homicide is three times higher than for non-Hispanic whites. It is daily fare in our local papers to read of bodies dumped in peach orchards, the putrid remains of corpses fished out of irrigation canals, or the body parts and bones of the long-dead uncovered by the cultivators. These are the remains of hundreds of young men from central Mexico who simply disappeared—shot or stabbed and then dumped by thieves and murderers.14

Professor Hanson’s sources, or rather the lack of them throughout the book, are not clear, at least from my reading of his information. First, according to a National Center for Health Statistics report published in 1998,
the Latino homicide rate is three times higher than that for non-Latino whites. However, it is also half the homicide rate of non-Latino blacks at the national level. The same CDC report also notes that the Latino homicide rate declined by 43 percent from 1990 to 1998. It is unfortunate that Hanson neglects to mention the dramatic drop in the Latino homicide rate over a period of intense Mexican immigration into the United States or the fact that Latino homicide rates are generally much lower than expected given social conditions.

Second, it is hard to envision any place could contain the remains of “hundreds of young Mexicans” without arousing suspicion from co-workers, neighbors, spouses, lovers, family members, and others. For a point of comparison, consider that the City of San Diego Police Department reported almost 1,000 (N = 932) Hispanic or Mexican total homicide victims between the years of 1960 through 2002. Thus we are asked to believe that the total number of Latino killings in one of the largest cities in the United States, over a forty-two-year time period, is likely substantially lower than what allegedly occurred in the Central Valley orchards. Moreover, it is not clear how the author concluded these were all Mexican victims of violent crime. Perhaps a new type of DNA test, one that can distinguish Mexicans from non-Mexicans, was conducted on these remains. Finally, it is regrettable that Professor Hanson did not provide any citations in his book to substantiate any of his claims. This is a task that he claims “professional Latinos” or “race hustlers” neglect in chapter 5 of his book.

A final example of public hysteria over immigrant crime, in this case singling out young Latinos rather than the Latino population as a whole, is provided by Heather MacDonald. MacDonald is a nonpracticing attorney and a fellow at the Manhattan Institute, a conservative think tank in New York City. She is also a contributing editor to City Journal, a magazine published by the Manhattan Institute. MacDonald’s claim follows:

Hispanic youths, whether recent arrivals or birthright American citizens, are developing an underclass culture. (By “Hispanic” here, I mean the population originating in Latin America—above all, in Mexico—as distinct from America’s much smaller Puerto Rican and Dominican communities of Caribbean descent, which have themselves long shown elevated crime and welfare rates.) Hispanic school dropout rates and teen birthrates are now the highest in the nation. Gang crime is exploding nationally—rising 50
percent from 1999 to 2002—driven by the march of Hispanic immigration east and north across the country. Most worrisome, underclass indicators like crime and single parenthood do not improve over successive generations of Hispanics—they worsen.\textsuperscript{19}

It is not difficult to confirm that there was a rise in gang-related homicide, not necessarily crime, between 1999 and 2002. It is extremely difficult, however, to make the connection to the “Hispanic march across the country” that MacDonald blends into one concern. First, we can cautiously estimate the number of gang-related homicides. In the Bureau of Justice Statistics report entitled “Homicide Trends in the United States,”\textsuperscript{20} the homicide circumstance section notes that “[f]or gang related homicides, the number of victims begins at 129 in 1976 and gradually increases to a high of 1,362 in 1993. It drops to 834 in 1998 followed by an increase reaching 1,119 in 2002.” According to my calculations this is a 34 percent increase from 1998 to 2002. Moreover, for some perspective, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that in 2002 there were 4,752 killings that began as some type of argument or fight. That same year 2,656 felony homicides were committed during a rape, robbery, burglary, theft, motor vehicle theft, or other crime. Most homicides are not gang related, and most homicides declined while immigration grew and immigrants spread across the nation.\textsuperscript{21} In addition, the connection to Latino/Hispanic disproportionate involvement, especially over time and across generations, was not established, since ethnicity was not detailed in this report—or in most crime studies, for that matter. Ethnicity is also not typically available in national data, one impetus for the studies that follow in this book.

Finally, it is also unfortunate that MacDonald did not provide sources for her contention that Puerto Ricans and Dominicans have long had high crime rates or specify a time period. To the best of my knowledge few scholars have access to Latino-specific data of this type.\textsuperscript{22} Given the concentration of Puerto Ricans and Dominicans in New York City, and the steep homicide decline in the city from 1990 to 2002, it is hard to imagine homicide rates for any group soaring during the period.

With these examples of the immigration-crime stereotype in mind, I turn to discuss the early work conducted on the topic.
Public anxiety about crime-prone immigrants and immigrant communities is as old as the topic itself.\textsuperscript{23} Rising immigration into the United States coincided with increased fear of crime in many areas—a presumed connection dating back to at least the early 1900s. At that time, massive waves of European immigration to the United States prompted the founders of American sociology in Chicago to concentrate on various consequences of immigration. Juvenile delinquency and other urban social problems were among their central concerns. Early scholars, especially Shaw and McKay,\textsuperscript{24} wrote about the high concentration of juvenile delinquency in areas adjacent to the downtown business and industrial districts. These low-income areas contained high levels of recent immigrants and southern black migrants. As Shaw and McKay note:

Thus the newer European immigrants are found concentrated in certain areas, while Negroes from the rural South and Mexicans occupy others of comparable status. Neither of these population categories, considered separately, however, is suitable for correlation with rates of delinquents, since some areas of high rates have a predominantly immigrant population and others are entirely or largely Negro. Both categories, however, refer to groups of low economic status, making their adjustment to a complex urban environment.\textsuperscript{25}

The Chicago data, and similar figures collected in several other cities by the authors and associates, noted that youth crime was concentrated in specific types of areas, regardless of “nativity and nationality.” They also noted that as immigrants or immigrant group members moved out of these areas and into better communities their juvenile crime rates declined. It was not immigrants or blacks per se but the conditions in which they settled that were important for juvenile crime.

The finding that the impact of immigration as a social process at the community level was linked to crime did not necessarily engender additional research on the characteristics of distinct immigrant groups and crime. This is telling because, as Roger Lane points out, around 1900 “[i]mmigrant status in itself was not significant . . . in that most foreign-born ethnic groups in Philadelphia were apparently less inclined to violence than native Americans.”\textsuperscript{26} This finding was echoed in a report issued
by the 1911 U.S. Immigration Commission, which found that immigration had not increased the volume of crime and noted that the presence of newcomers might have buffered criminal activity. Contra
types, the few empirical studies at the time generally did not discover newcomers to be hyperviolent or crime prone. Some evidence emerged that children of immigrants had higher levels of criminal activity than their parents but not necessarily higher rates than their native-born counterparts. Nevertheless, these early studies found that immigrants remained less involved in crime than the native born.

Most of the handful of early studies focused on European immigrants. A notable exception to this pattern, volume 2 of Mexican Labor in the United States, is perhaps the earliest quantitative study on Mexican immigration to the United States. In this study Paul S. Taylor described the labor market, educational, criminal justice, and fertility experiences of Mexican-origin persons in Chicago. By explicitly linking arrest statistics (felonies and misdemeanors) to local population sizes, he was able to compare white and Mexican criminal activities. While Mexicans were arrested at a percentage two to three times their population size, most of the arrests were not related to violence; rather, they were for property and alcohol-related offenses, a finding that Taylor linked to the high number of single males in the population. Regarding violence, Taylor noted that

\[ \text{assault of various kinds, and carrying weapons of various kinds comprise another 9.7 percent of the charges on which convictions were obtained against Mexicans. This percentage also is higher than similar percentages for American whites and all nationalities, which were 3.3 and 4.7, respectively.} \]

This is important to highlight because patterns of criminal involvement were shaped by social factors, including neighborhood poverty and the age and sex distributions of the immigrant population, not the inherent criminality of immigrant Latinos.

The Taylor study is significant because it was published during a time when the handful of existing immigrant crime studies largely compared European immigrants to southern black migrants in Chicago, Philadelphia, and New York City. Few scholars acknowledged the presence of La-
tino or non-European immigrants. The passage of restrictionist national-origin quota laws in the 1920s and assimilation campaigns gradually rendered the study of the immigrant European experience obsolete and forced scholars to focus on race or “black versus white” comparisons after World War II. Without data (and with few immigrants), researchers soon shifted attention from immigrant crime research to other aspects of urban social problems. In fact, in chapter 3 of this book Jeffrey Morenoff and Avi Astor note that there are now ten times as many articles on race and crime as on immigration and crime.

Contemporary Crime and Immigration Contexts

After 1965 and the dismantling of laws establishing preferences for immigrant Europeans, newcomers once again began arriving in large numbers. As noted at the start of this chapter, the contemporary immigrant influx is vastly different, in terms of national origins, from the influx at the turn of the last century. Most immigrants who have arrived since 1980 are from Latin America and Asia, while the vast majority of foreign-born arrivals in the 1910s and 1920s were from Europe. Moreover, today’s newcomers still live in the nation’s largest urban regions, but these places have become very different from the old immigrant destinations.

Undoubtedly, New York and Chicago are still significant settlement places for the foreign born, much as they were over a hundred years ago. However, contemporary immigrant communities in many ways define Los Angeles, San Diego, and, at the other end of the country, Miami, Florida. Substantial movements into or at least through cities such as New Orleans and Phoenix are also relatively common. Many of these places, which figure prominently as research sites in this book, also have had a long history of high rates of crime. Though the roots of such long-standing crime patterns lay elsewhere, in many instances Latinos and other immigrant groups have served as convenient scapegoats for contemporary crime problems.

Even as high levels of immigration revived stereotypical concerns about letting newcomers into the country, they simultaneously renewed research on a host of topics related to immigration in almost every branch of the social sciences. The exception was in scholarship on immigrants and crime and violence. This is surprising because the founders of American
sociology were concerned about the role of community disorganization in producing high crime rates and the disorganizing influences inherent in moving from rural Europe to urban areas of the United States.\textsuperscript{32}

Despite the general lack of research on contemporary immigration and crime, some scholars have examined the impact of recent immigration on violence and crime and have compared the characteristics of immigrant to nonimmigrant victimization. These include national, metropolitan, and community-level studies that control for percentages of recent immigrants while examining other factors associated with crime, including economic deprivation and residential instability. Almost all such research has reported null or negative effects of immigration on lethal and nonlethal violence, findings that are consistent with prior studies.\textsuperscript{33} That is, higher levels of immigrants either have no effect on or are associated with lower levels of crime and violence. These results may indicate that the areas or neighborhoods into which newcomers settle are revitalized or stabilized by the presence of immigrants, arguments consistent with the “immigration revitalization perspective” rather than with the premise that recent immigrants disrupt communities.\textsuperscript{34} Contemporary scholars are now more open to the possibility that an influx of immigrants into disadvantaged and high-crime communities may encourage new forms of social organization and adaptive social structures. Such adaptations may mediate the negative effects of economic deprivation and various forms of demographic heterogeneity (ethnic, cultural, social) on formal and informal social control, thereby decreasing crime.

In recent years, a handful of examinations of the relationship between immigrants and crime can be found in the work of Hagan and Palloni,\textsuperscript{35} Butcher and Piehl,\textsuperscript{36} Aguirre, Saenz, and James,\textsuperscript{37} and myself, including my research with Lee and Nielsen on the Mariel Cubans.\textsuperscript{38} All have suggested that immigrant differences in violent crime or incarceration, relative to the native born, are rare or nonexistent. Although considered original, if not pioneering, work by other immigration and violence scholars, these findings have not found a wide audience among members of the general public, policy makers, or the anti-immigrant pundits discussed earlier in this chapter.

The above-mentioned authors have provided some preliminary data, research findings, and lines of argument that have succeeded in challenging the contention that immigrants usually engage in crime more than the native born. However, I would suggest that because of their methodologi-
cal concerns, especially a focus on quantitative data, they fail to capture fully the array of violence and crime concerns by, for example, looking only at homicides or total violent crime rates. Most do not examine finer ethnic distinctions among groups, including underexamined groups such as Haitians, Asian subgroups, or Mexican border crossers, thus suggesting the need for additional studies on the topic. As we will see, the persistent problem of examining violence among immigrants—specifically the lack of original crime data—has been addressed in innovative ways by the contributors to this volume. Their results are informative and suggest that additional data collection efforts might produce even more fruitful studies on the notion that immigration begets crime.

As noted earlier, immigrants currently constitute a larger portion of the U.S. population than in the early 1900s. In fact, it is common to highlight this as one of the most profound and recent demographic transformations across the nation. The immigrant population currently numbers over thirty-three million (not counting an almost equal number of U.S.-born children of immigrants), with newcomers now composing almost 12 percent of the U.S. population. This percentage falls short of that a hundred years ago (about one-third of the population was immigrant or children of immigrants in 1910), but it could grow rapidly through immigrants’ continued entry and higher fertility rates than native-born Americans.

To be sure, it is not clear that the increasing proportion of new immigrants across time is directly linked to any change in the annual rates of violent crime. What is clear is that the annual percentage of immigrants has more than doubled since 1980 and that it rose steadily at the same time as rates of both homicide (per hundred thousand) and robbery (per thousand) at first fluctuated widely (between 1980 and 1994) and then dropped (between 1994 and 2002) (see figure 1.1). Robberies increased slightly from 1990 to 1994, the same period over which immigration was increasing. However, by 2003, while the percent of the total population that was immigrant had doubled compared with 1980, the homicide and robbery rates had fallen to levels at least half their previous rate in the same period. This of course does not suggest a causal relationship, but these data are contrary to popular wisdom suggesting that immigration is driving violence upwards. The trends reported in figure 1.1 show that two very different rates of violent crime—reported robberies (which are usually between strangers) and homicides (which typically do not involve strangers)—
both fluctuated dramatically during a period of steady increase in the proportion of the population that was composed of immigrants. Thus there is no clear evidence of increased violence over the last decade as the percentage of the nation’s population increasingly became foreign born. The national trends shown in figure 1.1 counter the widespread belief that more violence was generated as more “aliens” entered the United States, spreading destruction, killing over drug markets, or increasing criminal activity. In fact, while the figure does not offer a definitive causal connection, it suggests that the opposite may be true—over time it appears that more immigrants means less violence. Studies of specific immigrant-destination cities show the same result as the national trend.

However, the figure only shows national trends in immigration and violence over the last twenty-three years. As we will see in the following chapters, scholars who study this issue stress that the relationship between immigrants and violence is not always definitive but that when this connection is directly examined with empirical data there is typically a negative relationship or no association. The chapters that follow entail more detailed consideration of these issues.
Taking stock of the putative link between racial/ethnic/immigrant violence and crime is the aim of this book. To address this subject, the National Consortium on Violence Research (NCOVR) funded a grant to commission the initial papers. The papers were presented and discussed at a conference held in November 2003 and hosted by the Center for the Study of Urban Poverty at the University of California, Los Angeles.

Building on this convergence on the topics, the chapters presented here broadly assess the state of immigration and crime research in a number of ways. Some, for example, revise traditional theoretical perspectives on immigration and crime, examine victimization among hard-to-find undocumented immigrant populations, or examine the consequences of delinquency for immigrants (versus nonimmigrants) while facing problems of absorption into American society. Others explore the longitudinal effects of violence within and among immigrant populations and the impact of local conditions on immigrant violence. By addressing the state of crime investigations in the field of immigration and criminological research, the contributors demonstrate the relevance of this area of social inquiry.

The contributors were asked to provide chapters that would explore the problem of violence from their own unique perspective. Of course, the primary strength and intellectual contribution of this volume is the diversity of approaches, qualitative and quantitative, to the theme of immigration and crime and the gamut of crime types that the authors explore. Much of the focus is on exposure to crime or violence, crime and serious delinquency, and the consequences of violence, broadly defined to include incarceration, deviance, and antisocial behavior. In some chapters, crime is not treated so much in relation to the justice system as in terms of how immigrants are victimized as they enter the United States, search for employment, avoid racial/ethnic conflict in the workplace, or are singled out by others in incidents that are not always reported to the police or captured in traditional surveys. Although diverse in focus, all of the chapters challenge stereotypes of immigrant criminality—that is, of immigrants as a criminally inclined group—and help fill some of the gaps in contemporary knowledge with research instead of rhetoric.

Few studies consider the impact of recent immigration on violence, crime, and deviance, and few compare the characteristics of immigrant and nonimmigrant crime. Still, as several of the contributors discuss, there
are good theoretical reasons to expect that immigrants may be more likely to engage in crime than similarly situated native groups. Other researchers refer to the “immigration paradox”: finding unexpectedly favorable social and health outcomes, such as infant health, for immigrants despite social and economic conditions that social scientists usually associate with “social disorganization.” Scholars, especially some contributors to this book, are now expanding the notion of the immigrant paradox to include crime.

Of course, we are just beginning to understand the complex relationship between immigration and crime, especially at the community level. This issue will undoubtedly become increasingly influential for many of the new ethnic immigrant groups, in particular ones that are moving beyond traditional settlement places and into communities that were not affected in past decades. In many of these communities, residents have not been welcomed with open arms, and this new demographic shift and its implications should be examined in the future.

The chapters in this book do not cover everything about immigration, crime, and violence, but they do help us understand the importance of studying the topic. In many cases the contributors have had to grapple with racial/ethnic categories and definitions while compiling complete and reliable data. Because of these efforts, the authors have contributed important insights that make this book one of the first to explore the many dimensions of the relation between race/ethnicity/immigrant status and violence and crime. All of the authors are aware of the deep-rooted problems in this research area and have sought to overcome them in many ways. They should be thanked for completing this difficult task. The authors have many voices, differences in perspectives, interpretations, findings, and of course conclusions. Nevertheless, taken together the respective chapters should prompt much additional research.

Finally, the primary goal of this book is to assemble a diverse group of scholars who can offer innovative approaches to the study of ethnicity, immigration status, and crime, or the impact of immigration on violent events and crime. Taken together, they all extend this area of knowledge and offer guidance on much-needed future research efforts in this area of social inquiry. They also remind us that criminologists can no longer restrict studies of crime to whites and blacks. At the same time, immigration researchers can no longer ignore the study of violence or crime. Because the United States is increasingly multiethnic and immigrant communities are proliferating, the time has come to ask and answer more questions about immigration and crime than have been traditionally posed. Stereo-
types surrounding this issue also need to be examined in light of empirical studies. This book will hopefully guide much needed future scholarly activity in this important area of research.

NOTES

1. Due to restrictive legislation, most forms of legal immigration subsided in the 1920s and 1930s. The most recent immigration waves followed passage of the Hart-Celler Act of 1965.

2. Luke Larsen (2004) notes in *The Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 2003* that almost 12 percent of the population in the United States is foreign born. The majority originated in Latin America (53.3 percent) or Asia (25.0 percent). The remainder are from Europe (13.7 percent) or other regions of the world (8.0 percent).

3. For more on this topic, see Suro and Singer (2002).


5. Again, see Menjívar and Bejarano (2004).

6. For more, see Martinez and Lee (2000: 488–97).


12. For more on national rates, see Fox and Zawitz (2004).


15. See Keppel, Pearcy, and Wagener (2002). Local context in the form of homicide rates, especially the homicide rates in the Central Valley, would be more appropriate for reference points, but none were provided.

16. The homicide rate declined among all three racial/ethnic groups during this period, and Latinos/Hispanics had the steepest decline. See Keppel, Pearcy, and Wagener (2002: 5, table 1).


18. These are from archival data stored in the City of San Diego Police Department Homicide Unit for a research project in progress. I retrieved each homicide callout sheet by hand for the entire period.


21. MacDonald did not provide evidence that Hispanics were marching “east and north across the country.” She should have provided evidence of this very specific temporal and spatial claim, but none exists.
22. For a recent study on ethnic variations and violence in New York City and the New York City homicide decline, see Fagan and Davies (2003). However, Latino groups are not disaggregated in this study.
23. For more on this topic, see Martinez and Lee (2000).
27. See U.S. Immigration Commission (1911).
31. See Sutherland (1934); Lane (1979).
32. The most famous criminological examples of this research, of course, are the seminal publications of Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay (1931, [1942] 1969), but others would argue that Thomas and Znaniecki ([1918–20] 1984) played a role in conceptualizing the crime problems facing Polish immigrants. See chap. 2 of this volume.
33. For immigration and crime at the national level, see Butcher and Piehl (1998a); for the metropolitan level, see Hagan and Palloni (1998); for the census tract or community level, see Lee, Martinez, and Rosenfeld (2001); Martinez (2002); Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush (2001); Sampson and Raudenbush (1999).
34. See Lee and Martinez (2002).
35. Hagan and Palloni (1998) report a tenuous link between immigrants and crime in El Paso and San Diego. Immigrants in both places are at greater risk of conviction and imprisonment, in part, because they are more vulnerable to pretrial detention. Thus immigrants are disproportionately represented among prison inmates because of biases in processes that lead from pretrial detention to sentencing. The authors also tested the effects of legal and illegal immigration on crime in forty-seven U.S. metropolitan areas on the southwestern border. There was little evidence at the metropolitan level that immigration influenced crime.
36. Butcher and Piehl (1998b) found that immigrants were less likely than the native born to be institutionalized and much less likely than males with similar demographic characteristics to be incarcerated. In another paper, Butcher and Piehl (1998a) found that recent immigrants had no significant effect either on crime rates or on changes in rates over time in several dozen U.S. metropolitan areas.
37. Aguirre, Saenz, and James (1997) discovered that Mariel Cubans were more likely to be incarcerated than older Cubans.
38. See Martinez and Lee (2000); Martinez, Lee, and Nielsen (2001); Martinez, Nielsen, and Lee (2003).
39. Annual data are gathered from three sources. First, for percentage of the
total population that is immigrant or foreign born, I used population estimates from published U.S. Census Bureau volumes. For example, see Larsen (2004). In some instances annual measures in the 1980s were not readily available from this source, so annual data were interpolated. I also used two distinct types of violent crime measures. Homicide rates were gathered from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports for 1980–2003 (see Federal Bureau of Investigation 2003). Robbery rates for 1973–2003 were gathered from the National Crime Victimization Survey Violent Crime Trends data that are available on the Bureau of Justice Statistics Web site. Homicide rates are the number of homicides per hundred thousand persons. Robbery rates are number of robbery victimizations per thousand population age twelve and over. Readers should be aware that the robbery rates are substantially higher than the homicide rates but that they do not change the trajectory with the annual increase in percent foreign born.


42. Funding for this conference was provided through the National Consortium on Violence Research (NCOVR), Heinz School of Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University. Special thanks to the director of NCOVR, Dr. Al Blumstein, for supporting the conference grant.

REFERENCES


Shaw, Clifford R., and Henry D. McKay. 1931. “Social Factors in Juvenile Delin-


